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APPRAISING AMERICAN COLD WAR POLICY BY ITS MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Edward Pessen

The cold war has been discussed in a literature so massive, much of it so excellent, that it takes what may be a foolish intrepidity for a nonspecialist to venture into the scholarly controversy over the great conflict.¹ And yet, convinced from my earlier reading of the hundreds of foreign travelers who visited the United States in the nineteenth century that some newcomers to a place can offer interesting insights that had not occurred to longtime residents,² I trust that a relative newcomer in this instance to a historical theme may also be capable of offering an approach to it that is not hackneyed. My recent attempts to absorb the cold war literature suggest that one way of appraising the foreign policy of the United States since the end of World War II is to address a question that has not often been asked: what light is thrown on that policy when we focus on the means American leaders have relied on to implement it?³

What a nation's leaders call its policy is after all only its stated policy. More revealing of what a government is up to than its professed purposes are the things it actually does ostensibly to realize these purposes. That statesmen may be completely sincere in affirming the lofty goals of the policies they pursue provides no assurance that these policies are in fact congruent with their professed objectives. Policymakers are not immune to self-delusion. The biblical adage that by their deeds shall we know them, does not brush off human motives as insignificant. Its wisdom lies in its recognition that, since people are inclined to put their own actions, no matter how sordid, in the best possible light, these actions are better understood by their actual consequences, when these consequences could have been foreseen, than by the hopes, conscious or subconscious, of those performing the actions. (*Unanticipated consequences are not helpful in this context.*)

Let me proceed then to an examination of some of the important means by which the United States has waged cold war and the implications of its reliance on these means. Exigencies of space dictate that the discussion that follows be both selective and concise. I shall appraise the justifications offered

by the nation's leaders for waging cold war against the Soviet Union; the nuclear weapons buildup; the exorcising of pro-Soviet "subversion" at home; and covert operations against international "subversion" (I have placed apostrophes around the word subversion because of the impreciseness of most references to it).

Each of these means of implementing American policy has not only been variously interpreted but, in many instances, positively interpreted.⁴ Even the most determined naysayer would be hard-pressed to deny that some features of American cold war behavior have, by any fair or ideology-free reading, been praiseworthy. If the discussion that follows emphasizes the deplorable nature of the postwar actions of the United States, it does so not because the author is an iconoclast but because patent atrocities are not cancelled out by unexceptionable acts.

In the wake of the Gorbachevian Soviet Union's dramatic retreat from the domestic and foreign policies supported by Soviet leaders from Stalin through Chernenko, influential leaders in both the West and the East have recently been proclaiming that the cold war is over. Certainly the superpowers' bitter rhetorical denunciations of one another appear to have ceased. But if the foreign policy of the United States is more clearly revealed by the American government's behavior than by the lofty justifications offered for this behavior, announcements of the cold war's end may turn out to be premature, for INF treaty notwithstanding, the United States has not abandoned the nuclear option. Nor is there reason to think that the CIA has ceased performing "plausibly deniable" covert operations to promote the nation's ever more elastically defined "vital interests." Whatever the future may hold, the cold war behavior to date of the United States continues to warrant critical investigation.

Government-directed propaganda is an important means of engineering the popular consent necessary to successful prosecution of a foreign policy certain to require large public sacrifices. It becomes all the more important when that policy is directed against a nation that only yesterday had been our brave ally whose great suffering, loss of life, and military feats had enabled the United States to emerge relatively unscathed from a war against a frightful foe. In the aftermath of World War II, American leaders propagated a series of charges against what they called—and increasingly treated as—the Soviet enemy.

The chief accusations were that, despite the end of the war, the Soviet Union had expanded the size of the Red Army, obviously to engage in military aggression abroad; they planned to conquer Turkey and Iran; they were responsible for civil war in Greece; they violated the Yalta pact; they had brutally taken over eastern Europe, preliminary to launching an attack on central and western Europe; their control and manipulation of the Communist par-

ties of France and Italy constituted indirect aggression that, if it resulted in Communist electoral victories in these countries would, according to President Harry S. Truman and State Department adviser George F. Kennan, compel the United States to intervene militarily; they were responsible for launching a deadly nuclear weapons arms race by rejecting the unselfish American Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy; they were responsible for Communist subversion all over the world; they were slavish devotees to fanatical doctrines of world revolution that threatened world peace and security; their internal order was so pernicious and inhumane as to constitute an unacceptable threat to the United States; they harbored intentions so malevolent that their occasionally moderate actions had to be discounted as Machiavellian subterfuge; and they were no less loathesome and evil than Nazi Germany but more dangerous because their demagoguery was more seductive.⁵

What is particularly fascinating about the American indictment of the Soviet threat is that every one of the charges in the above catalogue was either groundless, absurd, false, or known by those making the charges to be false.

After the war, as American intelligence knew, the Soviets had substantially reduced the size of the Red Army. In the Middle East, as Melvyn P. Leffler has shown, they had no plans for military conquest.⁶ Probably to assure continued British acceptance of Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe, Stalin lifted not one finger to aid the Greek Communists. As Diane S. Clemens, the leading authority on Yalta has shown, for all their military superiority at the time, the Soviets made the greatest number and the most important concessions at the Crimean conference; Leffler has recently shown that they honored the commitments they made at Yalta at least as fully as did the United States and the West.⁷ Not Soviet aggression but French and Italian admiration, both of the USSR for its role in defeating the Axis powers and of the French and Italian Communist parties' role in waging underground war against Nazi occupiers, accounted for Communist popularity in these countries. That someone as intelligent and knowledgeable as George F. Kennan could recommend initiating World War III on the basis of an interpretation so absurd testifies to the power of cold war emotions to overrule sober, rational thought. That someone as powerful as Harry S. Truman could even contemplate sending American troops to war in western Europe on the basis of a premise so flimsy testifies to the amazing arrogance cold war emotions encouraged in the leader of the world's most powerful nation.

As Gregg Herken, other scholars, and leading American nuclear scientists have revealed, the Baruch Plan was far from unselfish; in rejecting it, the USSR did what American insiders expected them to do, in the face of the plan's one-sidedness.⁸ What was called Communist subversion in Third

World countries was most often nationalistic and poor people's movements that was Communist subversion only in the undocumented allegations of American propagandists. As American leaders had reason to know, the opportunistic and nationalistic Stalin regime slavishly adhered to no philosophical doctrine—except in its sometime rhetoric. What Stalin called “socialism in one country” animated the Soviet dictator far more than did the international revolution espoused by some of his ideological enemies. The appeal of Marxist ideas of equality and social justice to tens of millions of evidently decent western European Catholic working people and to many millions more outside of the Soviet orbit, belied the unserious State Department, CIA, and FBI appraisals of the theory. The NSC notion that the very Soviet order constituted an unacceptable threat to the United States was inconsistent in view of our earlier coexistence and even cooperation with that order, contrary in spirit to the principle of international law that a nation's internal arrangements provide no basis for intervention by foreign states, and appallingly arrogant.⁹

The charge that evil intentions underlay every Soviet act was clever propaganda, since it could not be disproven. It was also a cavalier charge, put forward not because there was good reason to think it true but because there was good reason to think that Western publics had been sufficiently indoctrinated to believe that the Soviets could do no right. As the anti-Communist Swedish historian Göran Rystad has persuasively shown, the USSR, unlike Hitler Germany, had no military blueprint for military conquest of Europe and the world. If the Soviets had what it takes to charm admired artists, intellectuals, and others outside its boundaries, that was because its theory and even its practices were no match for Nazi barbarism.¹⁰ And since in American judicial precedent, the only enemy of the United States is a nation with which it is at war, the Soviet Union did not qualify.¹¹

That the American justifications for cold war were dubious does not exonerate the Stalin government for its repellant postwar actions within and without Soviet borders. In his great farewell address, Washington had indicated that the characteristic brutal behavior of great powers toward their own and foreign peoples was no reason for the United States to adopt hostile policies toward them, so long as their misbehavior was not directed against us.¹² Soviet brutalities do not exonerate American postwar leaders for mounting a warlike campaign on the basis of dubious allegations against a vaguely defined Soviet camp and doing so in the absence of a direct threat to the United States.

What President Truman called the “centerpiece” of United States military strategy for defeating the Soviet Union in the war that many American leaders said was not only inevitable but imminent was nuclear bombs.¹³ High gov-

ernment officials had in 1945 spoken of The Bomb's capacity to compel Soviet acquiescence to America's postwar diplomatic demands.¹⁴ In the early cold war, the Truman Administration launched a nuclear weapons buildup, perfected secret plans for destroying Soviet industrial and population centers, and spoke openly of initiating nuclear war in response to Soviet misdeeds. According to presidential science adviser Jerome B. Wiesner, Nobel laureate physicist Hans Bethe, Kennan, and other informed Americans, the United States was subsequently responsible for almost every escalation in the nuclear arms race and in the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. And unto the present day, it is the United States alone that threatens if it sees fit to launch a nuclear strike against the other side.¹⁵

The American nuclear weapons policy is at odds with world opinion. The great religions and the great majority of nations are on record opposing the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.¹⁶ Aware of the near universal condemnation of weapons capable of destroying hundreds of millions of innocent people, American leaders sought to mollify the world public. The Eisenhower Administration, noting that rifle bullets killed people no less than did nuclear bombs, tried to win public acceptance of the ordinariness of the new weapons. The deterrence argument assured the world that our purpose in making, deploying, and threatening to use the bombs was to dissuade the vile Soviets from attacking western Europe or from launching their nuclear missiles on American and Western targets. Neither of the American arguments is impressive.

Nuclear bombs, unlike rifle bullets, are aimed not at individual soldiers but at mass populations, noncombatants as well as combatants. They irreversibly poison the atmosphere and earth as other weapons do not. That is why the world loathes and condemns The Bomb and the threatened use of The Bomb. American atomic and later hydrogen bombs were built and deployed not to deter a Soviet attack (that few Western leaders believed was likely) but to destroy the USSR for what we said were their unacceptable prior actions, beliefs, intentions, and way of ordering their society. Deterrence, as Admiral Gene R. LaRocque has noted, was an afterthought, designed to camouflage the actual plans of the United States government to resort to nuclear weapons in what American leaders said was the imminent war with the Soviet Union. Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has recently pointed out that if deterrence were truly the purpose of the American nuclear weapons buildup, no more than two hundred warheads would suffice. For, as Soviet leaders best know, such an arsenal would destroy most of their people and their country. The more than ten thousand nuclear bombs the United States has put in place testify to a different purpose than deterrence.¹⁷

The American nuclear weapons buildup inevitably induced the USSR to

create a massive arsenal of their own, which they have promised to unleash in full against any American nuclear strike, no matter how "surgical." The American fascination with the "winning weapon" thus brought the nation as well as the rest of the world insecurity, stupefying expenditures that no people could afford, the poisoning of the earth, and the frightful anxiety and tension resulting from the manufacture, testing, and deployment of weapons that could trigger a holocaust, whether by accident or design.¹⁸

In order to wage cold war against an alleged enemy that had neither attacked nor threatened the United States, America's postwar leaders sought to engineer the popular consent necessary to ensure the success of their unprecedented policy. To separate taxpayers from the enormous sums necessary to finance war preparations against the Soviet threat, the USSR had to be depicted in lurid terms. American cold war propaganda, of course, did just that. And the better to ensure that the policy would be neither deflected nor its execution delayed by the sharp public questioning that any new policy is likely to engender, American leaders took steps to inhibit such criticism. They did so by stigmatizing harsh critics as dupes, puppets, or agents of the Soviet Union, if not out and out traitors.

George Washington turned out to be amazingly prescient. In the farewell address, he had warned that the day might come when the "real patriots" who challenged a bad but popular foreign policy would be "suspected and odious" for their temerity. When President Truman's advisers convinced him to denounce former Vice President Henry A. Wallace as a puppet of the Reds for criticizing the Administration's anti-Soviet policy, they indeed helped make critics of the cold war "suspect and odious."¹⁹ Proclaiming that the republic was in mortal danger, threatened from abroad by the Soviet Union and at home by the American Communist party and its supporters—a Soviet "fifth column"—American political leaders mounted a crusade against domestic "Communist subversion" that paralleled their war on the international "Communist conspiracy" abroad. A substantial scholarly literature has demonstrated the enormities perpetrated in fighting the Red Menace at home by presidents and congresses, government bodies at the national, state, and local levels, the FBI, the House Un-American Activities Committee, schools, colleges, and universities, unions, veterans' organizations, the media, the entertainment industry, conservatives and liberals, self-appointed superpatriots. The Constitution was brushed aside, men and women were branded traitors not for what they had done but for what informers said their words meant, individuals were imprisoned, their reputations ruined on the basis of the doctored testimony of admitted liars and perjurers.²⁰

The "second Red Scare" succeeded in wrecking the Communist party, wiping out almost entirely its always slight membership, destroying its influence.

It destroyed much more than the Communist party, however. In an era in which J. Edgar Hoover, the greatly admired head of the FBI, could indict liberalism as akin to communism, a political atmosphere took shape that was uncongenial not only to Marxist thought but to socialist, radical, even reform thought. What a British scholar called the "Great Fear" was so pervasive, so intimidating, that President Dwight Eisenhower at one point withheld praise of George C. Marshall to avoid incurring the wrath of the most demagogic of all anticommunists, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin.²¹ McCarthy's recklessness embarrassed more fastidious antisubversives, eventually doing him in. But unthinking anticommunism survived McCarthy. Fearful of being labeled "soft on Reds," liberal Democrats often outdid conservative Republicans in demonstrating their antipathy to communism, their readiness to pass unconstitutional laws they had not read, in defending the country from the Red Menace.

The hard questions that should have been asked about the nation's cold war policy went largely unasked. When governmental actions became too questionable to ignore, as in Vietnam, most critics refrained from suggesting that culpability for that debacle may have possibly rested with the anti-Soviet policy the nation's Vietnam engagement had been made to implement. Knowledgeable persons aware of the questionable premises of the nation's cold war policy but lacking in what it took to state the fact, evidently took comfort in convincing themselves that the Soviet "enemy" was truly a repellent state. That obvious truth, however, was neither cause nor justification of America's unlawful and unconstitutional actions. In the cold war political and intellectual atmosphere, crimes and atrocities committed by the FBI and other government agencies went unchallenged, justified in the name of national security.²² Regulation and punishment of business malpractices have been largely forsaken, abandoned by opportunistic pols all too aware of how easily such policies could be smeared as anticapitalist and therefore pro-Communist.

James Bryce long ago observed that the American presidency was typically occupied by other than great men. Not the least fateful consequence of cold war anticommunism has been the rise to the nation's highest office of men whose chief claim to attention was their anticommunism, men almost embarrassingly lacking in the capacity, knowledge, integrity, and respect for law characteristic not only of superior presidents but of those once regarded as mediocre.

The most notorious means employed by the United States in waging cold war has been covert actions. Although the agency undertaking most of those actions was created ostensibly to gather, assess, coordinate, and disseminate intelligence, the CIA, as the world knows, appears to have devoted most of

its efforts to a variety of secret actions.²³ (The world knows this primarily because of the reports issued in 1976 by the Church Committee established by the U.S. Senate in the wake of the Watergate crisis to investigate "intelligence activities.")²⁴ It is hard to speak with precision about the nation's covert operations because of the secrecy surrounding them and their funding. That the executive branch in control of the CIA insisted on the principle of "plausible deniability" suggests that the agency was expected to perform morally and legally questionable acts. The revelations by the Church Committee, the Rockefeller Commission, and the former CIA agents and officials grown disenchanted with the agency, make clear that the CIA indeed fulfilled the expectation that it would regularly be up to no good.²⁵

Since its founding in 1947, the CIA has engaged in clandestine operations that were in violation of American and international law. It hired and protected Nazi war criminals, falsified their records, employed them to promote the subversion of the Soviet bloc, spirited some of them into the United States, where citizenship was conferred on them. It spent untold millions of dollars bribing foreign nationals and heads of state. It subsidized publishers and editors in the United States and overseas and created its own ostensibly private corporations. It induced major American corporations to undertake covert CIA projects. It engaged university administrators, scholars, journalists, union leaders, and other Americans to serve CIA purposes abroad. It disseminated false information or disinformation purportedly prepared or written by the sources that such "black information" was designed to embarrass or destroy. It financed and organized operations designed to undermine, destabilize, and overthrow governments of which it disapproved, not drawing the line at assassination of uncongenial individuals and government leaders. It trained foreign police and military forces in the techniques of torture and murder of "subversives." It helped organize and in some cases participated in clandestine invasions of and actual wars against nations with which the United States was at peace. And in blatant violation of the law creating it, the CIA kept files and spied on American citizens, tampered with and opened the mail of hundreds of thousands, and conducted drug experiments on unwitting American victims.²⁶

The United States has of course sought to justify its illegal actions, invoking a variant on the principle that the ends justify the means. The [Herbert] Hoover Commission appointed by President Eisenhower reported in September 1954 that "hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply [in the cold war]. If the United States is to survive [it] must . . . learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies."²⁷ Detached observers might find it hard to understand that the survival of the United States required it to undermine or overthrow non-Communist governments in Iran, Guatemala, the Domin-

ican Republic, Chile, Brazil, Indonesia, Zaire, and other countries. The argument that we were doing it for democracy is weakened, alas, by American unpleasant covert operations against democratically elected governments that American leaders did not fancy. As a most influential American said about Chile, we could not permit a country to go "Communist" because of the irresponsibility of its people.

A more comprehensive examination of the means of implementing the cold war policy of the United States would include the nation's treaties and military alliances, the Marshall Plan, and the wars we fought in Southeast Asia. And yet this glance at the American propaganda of justification, its nuclear arms policies, its war on domestic "subversion," and its diverse covert actions reveals a great deal about what the United States has been up to during the cold war.

Justifying cold war against the Soviet Union on grounds that American leaders themselves knew were unserious, in some cases outright lies, suggests that they pursued the policy for reasons other than those they stated publicly.²⁸ One suspects that a state that keeps secret its actual reasons for pursuing a fateful policy believes that these reasons could not withstand critical scrutiny or marshall public support. Divorced from the lofty rhetoric designed to sugarcoat the policy, the American buildup, deployment, and readiness to use nuclear weapons betrayed appalling moral callousness; William F. Buckley on no account could criticize American political and military leaders as he criticized antinuclear Catholic priests, of encouraging an "idoltrous veneration of human life."²⁹ The war on domestic subversion revealed the little faith and the equally little respect for the freedom of thought and the right to criticize of those who paid lip-service to these freedoms even as they suppressed them. And the covert actions that the executive branch directed, congressional overseers usually refrained from overseeing, and the media regularly asked few questions about, revealed that the post-World War II American government had become frighteningly amoral and arrogant as well as deceitful.³⁰ The objects of its detestation were for the most part nationalists who, unfortunately for them, stood in the way of American designs for their countries.

At a time when many Americans are assuring themselves that the United States has won the cold war, it is not modish to criticize or deplore the American actions that appear to have induced the Soviet Union to have altered their behavior in the ways demanded by American leaders. But as all responsible scholars know, our task is to say not what is modish but what we think is truthful. If John Quincy Adams was right, as I think he was, in reminding us that "the historian must have no country," then conscience, a love of truth, and what George Washington called "real patriotism" compel us to lay bare

and condemn unworthy actions by our own government.³¹ The most rigid relativism cannot deny that our government's flagrant lies, plans to incinerate much of the world, secret wars, and arbitrary assassinations are unworthy actions.

American cold war policy is better understood by the means the United States has relied on to wage it than by the rhetoric American leaders have relied on to justify it. One can only hope that the gloomy thought expressed by George Mason at the Constitutional Convention is not invariably true: nations that commit great atrocities will suffer great calamities. For, sad to say, the American cold war actions that have been catalogued here are indeed atrocities.

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1. Studies that I have found particularly illuminating include Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (1988); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (1987); Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (1972); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984* (1985); Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (1977); Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (1989); Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950* (1980); Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945* (1979); Adam B. Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II* (1971); Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta* (1970); Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy* (1972); David Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (1982); Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman and the Origins of the Cold War* (1982); George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War* (1973); D. W. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins 1917-1960* (1961); and Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (1973).

2. Most insightful are Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1835; 1840); Frances Trollope, *Domestic Manners of the Americans* (1832); Harriet Martineau, *Society in America* (1837); Francis Grund, *Aristocracy in America* (1839); Michel Chevalier, *Society, Manners and Politics in the United States* (1839); Charles Dickens, *American Notes* (1842); Thomas Hamilton, *Men and Manners in America* (1833); and James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (1888).

3. What I call the foreign policy of the United States was of course evolving throughout the postwar years. And yet, for all its inevitable shifts, the policy at its core continued to be directed against the Soviet Union and the nations and movements it was said to control. An informed discussion of some of these shifts can be found in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (1982).

While a number of scholars have discerned varying degrees of incongruence between American leaders' stated objectives and the means they relied on to achieve these objectives, the literature is largely bare of an approach focusing almost entirely on these means as the essential clue to understanding American cold war policy.

4. See Robert F. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (1973); the essay by

Schlesinger in Lloyd Gardner, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Origins of the Cold War* (1970); Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959); Walter Goodman, *The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities* (1968); Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, *The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth* (1983); William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (1978); and Kermit Roosevelt, *Counter coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (1979).

5. The catalogue of postwar charges against the Soviet Union is treated in almost all of the literature on the cold war. Good summaries are Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 82–85, 169–70, 176–77, 223, 234–35, 241–43, 263–66, 271–72, 288–90; and Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat*, chs. 1–5. See, too, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (1986), ch. 8, “Why the Cold War?” On NSC and U.S. military charges that the very “nature of the Soviet system” was an unacceptable threat, see Anthony Cave Brown, *Dropshot* (1978), pp. 42, 73. On American leaders’ recommendation of a military invasion of Italy if the Communists won the 1948 election, see Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (1979), p. 30.

6. David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (1982); Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1967* (1968), pp. 403–404, 414; Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, p. 270; Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The U.S., Turkey, and NATO, 1950–1952,” *Journal of American History* 71 (March 1985): 807–25.

7. Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949* (1982); Clemens, *Yalta*, passim; Melvyn P. Leffler, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War,” *International Security* 11 (Summer 1986): 88–123.

8. Herken, *The Winning Weapon*; Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (1975). It has recently been disclosed that H. V. Evatt, the Australian Chairman of the UN Atomic Energy Commission at the time, rejected criticism of the Baruch Plan on the grounds that “we might want to use these weapons against them [the USSR]” (cited in Mark Oliphant, “Three Men and the Bomb,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45, March 1989: 41).

9. At the Nuremberg trials Justice Robert Jackson observed that the Nazi leaders were in the dock not for what they had done in Germany but for the atrocities committed outside of German borders (cited in Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 1961, pp. 686–87).

10. Göran Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past? The Munich Syndrome and Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (1982).

11. In *United States v. Greathouse*, Federal Judge Stephen Field ruled that “the term ‘enemies,’ as used in the [Constitution], according to its settled meaning, at the time the Constitution was adopted, applies to . . . a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us” (cited in Charles Warren, “What is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?” *Yale Law Journal* 27, January 1918: 333–34). See, too, the section on “definitions” in the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 as amended (*United States Code Annotated*, Title 50, “War and National Defense,” Appendix, Section 2).

12. The best source for the famous address and the various drafts leading up to it is Victor Hugo Paltsits, ed., *Washington’s Farewell Address . . .* (1935). For a discussion of the implications of its foreign policy principles see Edward Pessen, “George Washington’s Farewell Address, the Cold War, and the Timeless National Interest,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 7 (Spring 1987): 1–25.

13. David Alan Rosenberg, “American Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,” *Journal of American History* 66 (June 1979): 62–97; Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, pp. 244, 288, 293; and Thomas H. Etzold and John L. Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (1978), pp. 361–64.

14. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, pp. 197–98, 237; Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, p. 132; and Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (1967), pp. 229, 240, 242.

15. Jerome B. Wiesner, “The United States: A Militarized Society,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41 (August 1985): 105; Kennan, *A Proposal for International Disarmament* (1981).

Bethe's observations, published in *Science* (November 1982), are reprinted in *The Progressive* (February 1983, p. 30).

16. *Encyclopaedia of the United Nations and International Agreements* (1985), pp. 574–75; *The Catholic Almanac* (1986), pp. 213–14; *New York Times*, April 16, 1983 and Dec. 26, 1985; and Theodore Draper, "Nuclear Temptations," *New York Review of Books* 30 (June 19, 1984): 42–48.

17. Gene R. LaRocque, "Address to the Academy of Political Science," *Defense Monitor* 20, 3 (1983); Sidney Lens, "The Deterrence Myth," *The Progressive* (February 1984): 16; Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, *To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans* (1986); Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense* (1977); Anthony Cave Brown, ed., *Dropshot: The United States Plan for War With the Soviet Union in 1957* (1978); and Peter Pringle and William Arkin, *S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War* (1983).

18. Harvey Wasserman et al., *Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America's Experience With Atomic Radiation* (1982); Helen Caldicott, *Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War* (1986). Estimates of the appalling effects of the dropping of hydrogen bombs on population centers by Dr. Herbert Abrams of the Harvard Medical School and others are in the *New York Times*, Oct. 22, 1982.

The likelihood of nuclear war was considered so great by nuclear scientists that in the 1980s the minute hand of the "doomsday clock" in the authoritative *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* was placed at two minutes before the midnight of nuclear holocaust. The recent INF treaty and the improved relations between the two superpowers have induced the editors of the *Bulletin* to turn back the minute hand to ten minutes before midnight.

19. Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and National Security, 1946–1948* (1971); Kenneth O'Reilly, *Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace* (1983); Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (1971); and Frank J. Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence* (1980).

20. Goodman, *The Committee*; Alistair Cooke, *A Generation on Trial* (1952); Stanley I. Kutler, *The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War* (1982); Michael Belknap, *Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party, and American Civil Liberties* (1977); Victor S. Navasky, *Naming Names* (1981); Ellen M. Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (1986); Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (1988); J. Fred MacDonald, *Television and the Red Menace: The Video Road to Vietnam* (1985); and William A. Dorman, "The Media: Playing the Government's Game," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 41 (August 1985): 118–24.

21. David Cate, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower* (1978).

22. Much evidence on the violations of the Constitution and the laws by J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI is presented in Athan Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition* (1988); and Richard Gid Powers, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (1987). Cate, *The Great Fear*, and O'Reilly, *Hoover and the Un-Americans* offer evidence on the atrocities perpetrated by various government bodies against individuals and the law.

23. A clear description and analysis of the National Security Act provisions dealing with the CIA and the controversy over the precise meaning of those provisions is David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (1961).

24. See the final reports of the Select [Senate] Committee to Study *Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities* (Washington, D.C. 1976). On the conflicts within the committee as it undertook its investigation, see Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation* (1985).

25. U.S. Senate Select Committee, *Covert Actions in Chile, 1963–1973* (1976); Rockefeller Commission, *Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States* (1975); Morton H. Halperin et al., *The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies* (1976); Ralph W. McGehee, *Deadly Deceits, My 25 Years in the CIA* (1983); Philip Agee, *Inside*

the Company: A CIA Diary (1975); John D. Marks and Victor Marchetti, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (1974); John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (1978); and Frank Snepp, *Decent Interval* (1977).

26. This catalogue of CIA "horrors" is based on the sources cited in note 25 above and on Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (1979); John Loftus, *The Belarus Secret* (1982); Seymour Hersh, "Huge CIA Operation Reported in the United States Against Anti-War Forces and Other Dissenters in Nixon Years," *New York Times*, December 22, 1974; A. J. Langguth, *Hidden Terrors* (1978); Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (1985); Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World* (1984); Paul E. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende* (1977); John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Operations Since World War II* (1986); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (1982); and Philip Taubman, "Casey and His CIA on the Rebound," *New York Sunday Times Magazine*, January 16, 1983.

27. Cited in Halperin, *The Lawless State*, p. 34.

28. Several truly intrepid scholars have sought to establish the actual motives of American policymakers, among them Richard J. Barnet, Gabriel Kolko, Seymour Melman, and Noam Chomsky. A recent brilliant and provocative attempt is Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century*, which in effect infers motives from what it forcefully argues was the American drive toward world hegemony.

29. Buckley's comment is cited in *The Progressive*, January 12, 1988, p. 12.

30. On congressional reluctance to exercise its oversight function, see Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry*.

31. See Edward Pessen, "'A Historian Must Have No Country': John Quincy Adams' Standard for Historians," *OAH Newsletter* 16 (February 1988): 2-3.